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Abstract
Currently over a third of schools in Britain are faith schools, yet their place within the British 
education system remains a hotly contested issue, 
with advocates and opponents exchanging charge 
and counter-charge. With the current debate sparked 
by the Government’s wish to establish more faith 
schools it is timely to explore some of the controversial 
issues involved. This article explores social division, 
intolerance and indoctrination as objections to faith 
schools and evaluates whether faith schools are 
educationally defensible.
Keywords: Inclusion; Democracy; Faith Schools
Introduction
Musical competencies
A faith school is an educational organisation with a 
distinct religious character. Historically, such schools 
were known as parochial schools, reflecting the 
Church of England heritage. Parochial schools were 
established and maintained by a religious body; their 
name was taken from the Latin parochialis, meaning 
‘of a parish’. Faith schools have always been part of 
the British education system. In the Middle Ages the 
Church was the sole provider of education in Britain 
(Parker-Jenkins 2002). Before the nineteenth century, 
education of children in England was considered to be 
the responsibility of the parents. Wealthy parents were 
able to employ private tutors or send their children to 
fee-paying schools, while the poor relied on schools 
run by charity organisations (Walford 2001). One such 
organisation was the Society for the Promotion of 
Christian Knowledge (SPCK), founded in 1698 (Morrish 
1970, cited in Walford 2001). Schools run by the 
SPCK were supported by churches and the aim was 
to instil religious morals and beliefs in the children. The 
government did not get involved in providing education 
for children, leaving the responsibility instead to the 
Church and other charitable organisations (Walford 
2001). However, after the Industrial Revolution there 
was a ‘major social and economical upheaval’ that 
‘called for social policy enactment’ (Parker-Jenkins 
2002: 275). The state came to see education as a vital 
agent in helping the nation’s economic endeavour and 
decided to get involved in providing public education.
Recent history of faith schools in England
In 2001, the New Labour government decided to 
increase the number of faith schools and provide 
funding for them (DfEE 2001, cited in Short 2002). Most 
of the faith schools in England are Christian schools, 
either Roman Catholic (RC) or Church of England (CE). 
There are approximately 4,700 CE schools and 2,100 
RC schools (Meer 2007). Jewish faith schools funded 
by the state have also been around for some time, 
and there are currently 37 of these. More recently, 
other faith groups such as Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs 
have opened faith schools. There are currently eight 
state-funded Muslim faith schools, two Sikh schools 
and one Hindu school (Berkeley & Vij 2008; East & 
Hammond 2006;).
As of January 2011 there are:
• 631 secondary schools with a religious character  
  (19 per cent of all secondary schools) educating 
  587,170 pupils (18 per cent of all secondary pupils) 
• 6,203 primary schools with a religious character 
  (37 per cent of all primary schools) educating 
  1,217,025 primary pupils (29 per cent of all primary 
  pupils).
In November 2010, the names of the first 25 ‘free school’ 
proposals approved to progress to the business case 
and plan stage were published. Of these, eight have a 
religious dimension, although they have not necessarily 
been proposed directly by religious groups. (BHA 2012)
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New Labour’s decision to expand faith schools and 
provide funding for them was welcomed by most 
religious communities, but opposed by others (Short 
2002). Policies to expand faith schools were seen 
by the government as a way to increase choice and 
diversity in the education sector (Berkeley & Vij 2008). 
However, the decision to expand faith schools is 
treated with caution by the media and public. There is 
a fear that an increase in faith schools will cause ethnic 
segregation (Walford 2003) leading to ‘parallel lives’ 
(Berkeley and Vij, 2008). Although the government has 
encouraged faith schools since 2001, Ed Balls at one 
point distanced the government from the courting of 
faith schools when he said, ‘We’re not leading a drive 
for more faith schools’ (House of Commons Children, 
Schools and Families Select Committee, 2008, cited 
in Berkeley & Vij 2008, p. 4). 
The concept of ‘parallel lives’ came from the Cantle 
Report which observed that an Asian person could 
go home after work and not see a single white 
person until the following day when returning to 
work. The same was said of a white man living in a 
mainly white council estate, that he never meets 
anyone who is not like him (Cantle, 2001). However, 
it is worth noting that ‘parallel lives’ were not the 
result of faith schools. On the contrary, Short (2002) 
argues that the content of children’s learning is what 
determines the extent of cohesion in a community. 
Arguing against faith schools, Romain (2001, cited 
in Short 2002) states that faith schools do not allow 
children from different backgrounds to mix with one 
another. This lack of interaction makes them ignorant 
of other cultures, resulting in hostility to others. 
Short (2002) counters this argument by stating 
that ignorance does not lead to hostility; rather the 
prejudice in circulation leads to hostility. Contact with 
other cultures is also insufficient in fostering community 
cohesion while prejudice is prevalent in societies (Short 
2002). Peter Arkins (2001, cited in Short 2002) is 
another critic of faith schools. He asserts that religions 
promote intolerance and that therefore faith schools 
cause friction between religions. This intolerant 
attitude is then disseminated to future generations. 
Short (2002) rejects Atkins’ claims, stating that there 
is no data to support them. Dunn (2000, cited in Short 
2002) supports Short, stating that it is hard to find any 
evidence that suggests separate schooling causes 
conflict.
Faith schools as a source of social division and 
intolerance?
An explicit assumption made by some critics of 
faith schools is that mixing of children from diverse 
backgrounds is an effective antidote to racism and 
intolerance. This assumption, known to psychologists 
as ‘the contact hypothesis’ (Short 2002), may 
nevertheless be seen as incompatible witha body 
of research that has exposed racist and intolerant 
activity in mixed primary schools in general (Troyna 
and Hatcher 1992) and has documented particularly 
extreme cases of it. A key reference point is an 
incident at Burnage School in Manchester, where 
in 1986 Ahmed Ullah, an Asian teenager, was 
murdered by a white racist pupil. Evidence of this kind 
demonstrates that contact per se cannot be relied 
upon to diminish prejudice, a lesson that has been 
available to educationalists and policy makers since 
Horowitz’s (1936) pioneering studies of children and 
race in the United States. He found that sixth grade 
white boys attending an all-white school in New York 
showed the same level of prejudice as those attending 
an integrated school in the city despite, presumably, 
fewer opportunities for interracial contact. This and 
other research has prompted psychologists over 
the past half-century to condemn the early version 
of the contact hypothesis as naive and misleading. 
Consequently, Ashraf (1990) and Short (2002) have 
been seen as advocates of Gordon Allport’s (1954) 
groundbreaking work on the social psychology of 
racism, discovering that one of the most effective 
ways to impart knowledge about people different from 
oneself is through academic teaching in schools rather 
than the naive laissez-faire approach which assumes 
that mere exposure and contact with ‘difference’ will 
resolve prejudices.  As one way forward, Shabir Akhtar 
(1992) has encouraged a type of ‘delayed assimilation’ 
which states that:
‘A minority struggling to maintain its identity often 
welcomes a limited amount of isolation that might 
enable it to gain the confidence and security it 
needs in the early days of its establishment. That 
confidence, once achieved, might later help in its 
attempts to assimilate on its own terms.’ (p. 43)    
Indoctrination rather than education?
Another criticism directed at faith schools comes from 
secularists who believe that all schools should be 
free from religion . They argue that schools and even 
parents have no right to indoctrinate children into any 
religion (East & Hammond 2006). This claim prompts 
the question, are faith schools really indoctrinatinrather 
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than educating? Are faith schools at variance with 
the liberal education ethic? By liberal education we 
refer to the commonly held understanding of this as 
embodying such aims as the fostering of personal 
autonomy, intellectual and emotional maturity and 
well-being.  
From a liberal educational perspective, Callon (1997) 
examines the argument that the common school 
operates as a vehicle of civic education to perpetuate 
the ideal of ‘deliberative democracy’, which 
encourages ‘open discussion in which diverse views 
are voiced and collectively evaluated, make, apply, 
and revise the norms by which their community lives’ 
(p. 24). Callon argues that religious schools, despite 
inculcating positive values, are not able to provide 
the approach required for a good civic education and 
therefore cannot provide a good liberal citizenry. Yet 
it can be argued that mainstream public schools also 
impose a singular moral hegemonic viewpoint based 
on secularism and Eurocentrism. For example, Zine 
(2007) argues that secular Eurocentric approaches 
to knowledge masquerade as universal ways of 
knowing but are culturally situated viewpoints that are 
in opposition to faith-centred world views and also 
involve fidelity to a particular partisan world view or 
view of ‘the good life’.
McLaughlin (1992) argues that for various reasons the 
common school may not meet the needs of all students 
(whether on religious, cultural or special needs grounds) 
and that, from a social justice perspective, there can 
be a view that supports separate schools from within 
a liberal framework, providing they are able to satisfy 
the conditions of developing critical rationality and 
independence. He argues that there can be a plurality 
of legitimate forms of liberal education and schooling 
that can be starting point for a child’s journey toward 
autonomy and liberal citizenship, and that these may 
start from a particular world view or cultural identity. 
Spinner-Halev (1997) calls this ‘moderate separatism’, 
where early childhood and elementary education in 
religiously based schools can actually encourage 
greater knowledge of self without compromising the 
knowledge of others and that this knowledge of others 
may occur in sites other than schools or through 
transition to common schooling in higher grades. 
Consequently, it can be argued that even from a liberal 
educational perspective, faith schools are a good idea 
and educationally defensible.
Thinking philosophically about faith schools
The word autonomy has been mentioned a few times 
and is clearly of seminal importance to the notion of 
liberal education. So what is it? The concept revolves 
around definitions of self-knowledge, independence 
of thought, self-sufficiency, a responsibility for one’s 
own actions, individual freedom and the worth of the 
individual as an individual. There are also nuances here 
of originality and independence of thought and action 
(Rawls 2001; Meer 2007). Additionally, there exists an 
important historical element, for as an educational aim 
autonomy is seen as a key element of progress within 
the development of educational practice and theory, 
as opposed to a perception of indoctrination within the 
educational aims of the past, either through religious 
or class domination.
One of the most commonly shared views about 
education is that it should encourage the development 
of rational and moral autonomy which, in the recent 
liberal tradition, is characterised by the work of Ronald 
Dworkin (1985), Amy Guttman (1995) and Joseph 
Raz (1986) among others. This position opposes all 
forms of faith schooling and strenuously argues that all 
societies that support autonomy must protect children 
from ‘believers who wish to impose on them a non-
autonomous conception of the good life’ (White 1990, 
p. 105). This is a central argument contained within 
the Humanist Philosophers’ Group’s (HPG) influential 
pamphlet, Religious schools: the case against (HPG 
2001). The HPG begins by charging faith schooling 
with ‘indoctrination’ – which they characterise as 
limiting the autonomy of a child by implanting beliefs 
that neither empirical evidence nor rational argument 
might change. They then state that:
 
‘given the importance of fundamental religious 
and value commitments to a person’s life, such 
commitments should be entered into only subject 
to all the normal requirements for valid consent: 
in particular, competence, full information and 
voluntariness. Religious schools... are likely to 
violate these requirements, partly because of 
(younger) children’s lack of autonomy and partly 
because of the nature of such schools’ missions’ 
(2001, p. 10). 
According to this perspective, young people in religious 
schools are denied both the option and opportunity to 
develop competencies in making informed choices, 
specifically because such schools are predisposed to 
indoctrinate rather than foster autonomy.
Are faith schools educationally defensible?
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However, considering the above definition of 
autonomy, can the desire to pursue the ideal of 
autonomy have any flaws? Presumably to be 
autonomous one must develop a critical faculty, the 
ability to question what one is told and hence not 
be vulnerable to indoctrination. Indeed, developing 
this type of questioning is a cornerstone of liberal 
education. No stone is unturned in the pursuit of truth 
or at least one’s perception of truth. Constant doubt 
is essential to maintain a critical attitude, for unless 
doubt is constant we allow the possibility of accepting 
from others unquestioningly, or accepting things 
perceived by the senses simply on face value.  
To talk of educational aims in the context of constant 
doubt renders such aims somewhat meaningless. We 
aim to establish good citizenship? And this means 
respecting others? Is it relevant if others do not share 
the definition of respect? What relevance does respect 
have in a meaningless universe? Meaningless because 
if as a group we agree what good citizenship values 
are and that they are worthwhile, we are just as aware 
that we can either be wrong or that other bodies of 
people could be directly opposed to our values – is it 
not futile to establish such aims if they are not shared 
in a wider sense? Peters (1965) argues in ‘Education 
as initiation’ that the educational criterion should be 
‘that something of value should be passed on’. Surely 
it could be argued that the element of constant doubt 
and the resulting over-reliance upon materiality is not 
a value worthy of being passed on. Again as Peters 
says:
‘to be ‘educated’ implies (a) caring about what is 
worthwhile and (b) being brought to care about 
it and to possess the relevant knowledge or 
skill in a way that involves at least a minimum of 
understanding and voluntariness’ (1965, p. 97).
The introduction of doubt, which permeates the 
thinking of the developed world, is challenged as to 
whether it is a worthwhile thing. The debate asks if 
it is possible to establish ‘worthiness’ in our present 
thinking climate. Peters argues that:
‘It implies, first of all, that the individual who is 
educated shall come to care about the valuable 
things involved, that he shall want to achieve 
the relevant standards. We would not call a man 
‘educated’ who knew about science and yet 
cared nothing for truth or who regarded it as a 
means to getting hot water and hot dogs’ (1965, 
p. 96).
How does one care and commit oneself to truth when 
an inculcated and overriding sense of doubt prevents 
one from accepting truth even if one should happen 
to perceive it? The following statement sums up this 
attitude:
‘‘Men were made for higher things, one can’t help 
wanting to say, even though one knows that men 
weren’t made for anything, but are the products 
of evolution by natural selection’ (Smart & Williams 
1973, pp. 18–19).
Based on the above discussion, it could be argued 
that children attending a non-faith school are also 
being indoctrinated, but into a secular way of thinking 
(Grace 2002, cited in Meer 2007). This accords with 
the statement of John Stuart Mill (1969 [1859]) that 
‘Every education system makes use of indoctrination’.
Unpacking indoctrination and the concept of 
‘choice’
‘Indoctrination is difficult to define, as the grounds 
upon which it is based are vague: to some extent, 
it can be argued that all education is indoctrination 
insofar as it informs and initiates the child into the 
doctrines and beliefs within which s/he is placed 
(Gatchel 1972; Thiessen 1993). The concept of 
indoctrination can only be perceived as in effect on 
differing levels. Is any institution or human interaction 
free of indoctrination? A sharper definition within an 
educational context is provided by Atkinson (1965) 
who sees the distinction as one between teaching 
‘about’ morals and teaching in morals, or teaching 
‘that’ as opposed to teaching ‘how’. To illuminate 
this further, teaching ‘how’ involves, as Atkinson puts 
it, ‘providing adequate support, by way of proofs, 
reasons, evidence, whatever may be appropriate to 
the field in question, for the conclusions it has sought 
to impart. Indoctrination does not require this, it 
seeks only conviction and assent and any teaching 
procedure is acceptable in the pursuit of these aims’ 
(p. 172). There is also a distinction between treating 
someone as an end in themselves or simply as a 
means.
Faith schools could be questioned as to whether 
children are provided with ‘choice’ as Dearden (1984) 
stipulated. In other words, are the pupils exposed 
to theories and ideas that may be contrary to the 
school’s religious ethic? I think that it could be argued 
that they are inevitably exposed to these alternatives 
by the methodology employed wherein dialogue 
between all members of the school community is 
promoted.  Inherent in this is the understanding that 
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criticism or questioning of one’s views helps to clarify 
one’s views. A condition of no criticism, no debate in 
the teacher–pupil relationship is probably indicative of 
indoctrination. But perhaps more importantly children 
are exposed to alternatives to their own cultures and 
beliefs simply by being a minority within the host 
community.
Many faith schools, for example Muslim and Christian 
schools within the British state system, do adhere 
to the principles of teaching ‘about’ morals both in 
a universal sense and for their relevance within the 
Quranic and Biblical worldview, and teach how and 
why things occur rather than dictate and instruct 
(Wright 2003). Teaching in Muslim and Christian 
schools uses ‘adequate support... proofs, reasons, 
evidence, whatever may be appropriate to the field 
in question, for the conclusions it has sought to 
impart’ (Wright 2003?).[[above this quote is ascribed 
to Atkinson, p. 172]] Admittedly these will not always 
be conclusive proofs because of the nature of some 
of the subject matter, nor do we think that is what 
Atkinson (1965) had in mind. On the other hand, 
evolution is taught within the state system as if it is 
a confirmed scientific fact. The aim is not to affirm or 
dispute evolutionary theory but rather to point out that 
at this stage it is only a theory or conjecture and yet 
within many schools it is taught as actual fact. The 
point is made effectively by Evan Shute (1961) in his 
Flaws in the theory of evolution which consists of a 
series of essays written by evolutionists themselves.
We emphasise, this is not to say that indoctrination 
does not take place within faith schools but rather to 
question the degree to which and the intention with 
which it is carried out. Is the child or student used to 
preserve a cultural ideal as a means to an end or is 
each of them perceived as an individual, an end in 
themselves? Hence, once again, this prompts the 
question, are government-run schools any the less 
indoctrinating?
In The theory and practice of autonomy, Gerald 
Dworkin (1988) conducts an interesting and balanced 
exploration of moral authority vs personal autonomy. 
He examines the nature and the value of autonomy and 
uses it to analyse the distinction between paternalism, 
indoctrination and autonomy. Aiken’s (1962) definition 
of autonomy is also quoted by Dworkin and used to 
establish criteria to distinguish between indoctrination 
and personal autonomy:
‘A person is morally autonomous only if he cannot 
accept without independent consideration the 
judgement of others as to what he should do. If 
he relies on the judgement of others he must be 
prepared to advance independent reasoning for 
thinking their judgement likely to be correct.’
Based on this definition, Dworkin then proceeds to 
examine specific examples of indoctrination which 
in turn highlight those particular areas where conflict 
between a faith school and mainstream education 
may lie.
To cite the example of a Muslim school, the Quranic 
text is considered to be the word of God, and the 
Quranic paradigm and world view based on this text 
constitutes the Islamic perspective. Education within a 
Muslim school is based on the complete acceptance 
of the statement ‘principles are acceptable because 
they are the word of God’ (Hermansen 2003), which 
in relation to Dworkin’s criteria can admittedly only be 
seen as indoctrination.
Nevertheless, the opposing statement, something 
along the lines of ‘These principles are unacceptable 
for we do not know whether God really exists’, 
provides no more of a foundation. Is there anything 
less doctrinal than the first statement? On what basis 
is the second statement considered superior when 
it can be argued that there is proof of neither God’s 
existence nor inexistence. Can reasoned proof be 
acceptable to that which claims suprasensibility or 
the metaphysical? It can be argued that to present 
doubt or negation as being the normal and neutral 
attitude and thereby escape the obligation to furnish 
a proof in one’s turn, is to adopt an arbitrary position. 
Consequently, in an environment in which the majority 
professes a belief in the divine, it would clearly be 
atheism that would stand out as an affirmation to be 
proved.
Here we are dealing with nothing less than the conflict 
generated by the competing claims of science and 
religion to explain the fundamental principles which 
govern our lives. Stephen J. Gould (2001) proposes 
that the magisteriums (a coherent body of teaching 
or discipline which operates consistently according 
to its own coherent rules) of science and religion are 
not competent to encroach upon or make judgements 
about the regulated body of arguments which 
constitute any other magisterium. In short, he believes 
that neither should presume to legislate concerning 
the other’s beliefs.
Nevertheless, given the cultural predominance of 
the atheist view, it can be argued that autonomous 
rationalism is worthy of criticism for claiming to 
embark upon thought without the hindrance of any 
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initial dogma while itself starting from a dogma that 
nothing exists except that which we perceive by 
reason and the senses. All thought is based on some 
initial premise, the latter no less than the former.
For Heidegger (1996), modern thought, derived from 
the Western metaphysical tradition, has mistakenly 
located the essence of ground in a fundamental 
principle. A principle is what stands first in a series 
of propositions, which derive their origin from that 
principle. But he perceives the problems as lying in 
the very nature of its formality as a first and general 
principle. As a ‘principle’ it must be the fundament of 
other propositions. To come to a full understanding of 
this we must clarify the definition of, the fundamental 
meaning of or the grounds for understanding the 
word ‘principle’. In fact the same would apply to the 
words and concepts ‘ground’ and ‘fundamental’. The 
difficulty here is, where are we to find a definition for 
such words except within the ‘principio rationis’? As 
already stated, a principle is defined as that which 
contains a fundamental reason for another. While 
the principio rationis may be the ground for all other 
principles, what grounds of definition is it based on? It 
is arguable that this proposition is itself ‘something’ in 
relation to ‘nothing’ and is without reason and ground. 
Hence, according to its own definition it too must have 
a grounding but as it claims to be ‘the first principle’ 
nothing should come before it and so it thereby denies 
itself. The alternative would be an infinite regress, for 
each progressive grounding for a ground would require 
a ground itself. What is hereby revealed is that every 
beginning, every first principle is nothing of the kind 
but involves some kind of initial arbitrary assumption.
Does an education’s being based upon a primordial 
belief in the divine and concerned with an area 
of human development automatically render it 
indoctrinating and inauthentic? Such an understanding 
of the believer and faith is too simplistic. Clearly there 
does exist the aspect of deciding for the ethical 
possibilities given within a religious tradition, in the 
sense of passing from a conventionalistic affirmation 
of values to ‘owning’ them, to internalising them rather 
than simply following external influences. Ironically 
this has been a traditional ideal of Western education 
and can also be expressed in terms of Heidegger’s 
general dynamic of authenticity, as a coming to one’s 
own decision in the midst of finite world involvements, 
and in terms of temporality, as a bringing to presence 
of future possibilities in the midst of an appropriated 
past. We referred to this above when discussing 
Heidegger’s view of both accepting our place in the 
world and our finiteness as ‘poignanting’. In relation 
to this authenticity it should be understood in terms 
of the tension between socialisation and individuation, 
rather than a severance from society and tradition. 
Finally, upon critical examination of some of the basic 
precepts of liberal education (including personal 
autonomy) as practised in state-maintained education 
(non-faith schools), our view is that they are no less 
indoctrinating than faith schools. 
Conclusion
Two reasons have been advanced for suggesting 
that non-denominational schools may be no more 
likely than faith schools to foster ethnic and religious 
harmony (Short 2002). The first is that the prerequisite 
of successful contact cannot be guaranteed and, 
even if it could be, the benefits, seemingly, are of 
limited value, for changes in attitude tend not to be 
generalised outside of the original contact situation. 
Second, it has been argued that, in any case, the 
relevant consideration is not contact, even under 
ideal conditions, but anti-racist and tolerant education 
which can, in principle, be undertaken as effectively in 
a faith school as in a non-denominational one.
The challenge for both public and faith schools is to 
develop ways to have a complementary coexistence 
as parallel systems, and interactive curricula that 
implicate one another. A system that engenders 
cooperation and interaction between the various 
religious and secular public schools would provide a 
mutual opportunity for growth and learning. Secular 
Eurocentric schooling in the UK can no longer 
masquerade as an ideologically neutral space when 
it affirms particular identities and discourses and 
marginalises others. By recognising religious pluralism 
as a positive and intrinsic aspect of society, a truly 
inclusive school system centring the knowledge and 
experience of communities on the margins would 
weather well the challenges of social division and 
foster racial and religious tolerance.  
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